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ABSTRACT: According to Helen Longino, objectivity is necessarily social as it depends on critical interactions in com-
munity. Justin Biddle argues that Longino’s account presupposes individuals that are completely open to any 
criticism; as such individuals are in principle able to criticise their beliefs on their own, Longino’s account is 
not really social. In the first part of my paper I argue that even for completely open individuals, criticism for 
maintaining objectivity is only possible in community. In the second part I question Biddle’s interpretation of 
Longino’s conception of the individual. I conclude that objectivity as Longino describes it is necessarily social.
Keywords: Biddle, Collins, criticism, epistemic subject, Kusch, Longino, objectivity, rule-following, social epistemology, 
tacit knowledge.
RESUMEN: Según Helen Longino, la objetividad es necesariamente social puesto que depende de interacciones críticas 
en una comunidad. Justin Biddle defiende que la explicación de Longino presupone individuos que están ente-
ramente abiertos a cualquier crítica; y, puesto que estos individuos son en principio capaces de someter a crítica 
sus creencias por sí mismos, la explicación de Longino no es realmente social. En la primera parte de mi artículo 
defiendo que incluso para individuos enteramente abiertos, la crítica para el mantenimiento de la objetividad 
solo es posible en una comunidad. En la segunda parte pongo en cuestión la interpretación de Biddle sobre la 
concepción del individuo de Longino. Concluyo que la objetividad, tal y como la describe Longino, es necesa-
riamente social.
Palabras clave: Biddle, Collins, crítica, sujeto epistémico, Kush, Longino, objetividad, epistemología social, seguir-una-re-
gla, conocimiento tácito.
1. Introduction
The interest of contemporary philosophy of science towards social aspects of science is in-
disputable; however, the way to specify these social aspects and to understand the claim 
that science is social is very much a matter of dispute. The aim of my paper is to contribute 
to this discussion by addressing the argument Justin Biddle (2009) has recently suggested 
concerning Helen Longino’s (1990; 2002) account of objectivity. While responding to 
Biddle’s argument is the primary aim of the paper, doing so I make a more general sugges-
*  This research was supported by European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Pro-
gramme DoRa, which is carried out by Foundation Archimedes. I would like to thank Endla Lõhkivi, 
Martin Kusch, the audience at the EPSA13 conference in Helsinki, participants of the doctoral seminar 
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tion that assessing one’s and others’ claims in light of intersubjective norms and alternative 
perspectives as a part of being objective is impossible without community and in this sense 
it is essentially social.
In his paper, Biddle presents a powerful argument against the characterisation of 
Longino’s account as social. He argues that implicit in Longino’s account is a particular 
conception of the individual. According to this conception, the individual has capabilities 
that make social interactions unnecessary for maintaining objectivity—such individuals 
can in principle do it on their own. Thus, Longino’s claim about the fundamentally social 
nature of her account is refuted; social interactions may be useful in practice but are not 
strictly necessary in principle. Biddle suggests that social epistemology should employ a dif-
ferent conception of the individual that is compatible with a fully social account of science, 
and describes briefly how such an account could look like.
In my paper, I argue for the fundamentally social nature of Longino’s approach to ob-
jectivity. In the first part of my argument, I discuss whether the individuals that according 
to Biddle are presupposed by Longino’s account would be able to achieve objectivity in iso-
lation. I argue that they would not: community would be required for objectivity even in 
case of such individuals. In the second part, I engage with Biddle’s interpretation of Longi-
no’s conception of the individual directly and argue that the textual and contextual sup-
port for it is not unambiguous. Instead, there is evidence for a different conception and 
this alternative conception supports the characterisation of Longino’s account as social. I 
conclude that both arguments support the claim that sociality is necessary for objectivity in 
Longino’s approach; objectivity in the sense that Longino discusses cannot be asocial.
In the following part of the paper, I describe Longino’s account of objectivity and sum-
marise Biddle’s argument against her claim that objectivity, so understood, is social and can 
only be fully realised in community. In the third part, I argue that two crucial aspects of ob-
jectivity, as Longino and Biddle discuss it, require socialisation and belonging to commu-
nity even if the individual is understood in the way that Biddle ascribes to Longino. De-
veloping this argument I draw on Harry Collins’s (2010) account of strong collective tacit 
knowledge and Martin Kusch’s (2002) account of rule-following. In the concluding part of 
the paper I discuss the evidence for an alternative conception of the individual in Longino’s 
account, suggesting that some aspects of Longino’s conception that Biddle overlooks share 
important similarities with the conception Biddle himself defends as appropriate for social 
epistemology.
2. Longino’s account of objectivity and Biddle’s criticism
Before discussing Longino’s account of objectivity and Biddle’s criticism it is helpful to 
clarify how objectivity is understood in Longino’s account (Biddle does not discuss the 
meaning of objectivity as a separate issue and his usage follows Longino’s). In her discus-
sion of objectivity, Longino (1990, 62-66) distinguishes between its two senses. In one 
sense, objectivity is connected with the notion of truth: to be objective (for a hypothesis) 
is to represent the facts of the world truthfully. In another sense, objectivity is understood 
as the opposite of subjectivity: to be objective (for a method or for a hypothesis achieved 
as the result of its application) is to rely on non-subjective or non-arbitrary criteria. Else-
where, Longino defines the latter sense of objectivity as “independence from subjective 
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bias” (Longino 1990, 75) and freedom from “intrusion of individual subjective preference” 
(Longino 1990, 76). It is this sense of objectivity that Longino is concerned with.
The problem of objectivity is salient for Longino due to her account of evidential rea-
soning (Longino 1990, 38-48 and 2002, 124-28). As Longino argues, a state of affairs does 
not determine a unique hypothesis that would explain it: alternative hypotheses are possi-
ble on the basis of the same evidence. In order to fill in this logical gap, evidential reasoning 
must inevitably rely on some background assumptions in light of which a certain state of 
affairs can be seen as evidence for a particular hypothesis. However, if evidential reasoning 
always involves background assumptions, subjective biases can influence acceptance of hy-
potheses via those assumptions.
Longino argues that this danger can be avoided, and objectivity maintained, thanks to 
the social nature of knowledge production (Longino 1990, 66-76). Before being recognised 
as a part of public knowledge, individuals’ claims are subject to scrutiny by other members 
of knowledge-producing community. Claims are criticised, modified, cited in agreement or 
disagreement, extended and tested in new situations. In this process, initial claims are mod-
ified towards greater intersubjective acceptability—problematic idiosyncratic assumptions 
behind them are exposed and must then be defended, modified or abandoned. Collec-
tive criticism thus allows for explication and subsequent modification of assumptions that 
might otherwise remain hidden for their bearer.
Longino thus argues that in order for objectivity to be possible, critical dialogue in 
community is necessary. However, different communities may be better or worse at sup-
porting collective criticism that sustains objectivity. For example, exposing problematic 
assumptions may be relatively ineffective if community does not encourage free critical 
interactions. Moreover, while critical dialogue may be generally effective for blocking in-
dividual biases, biases shared by entire community may remain hidden. To address the 
first problem, Longino suggests four criteria that allow judging conditions for criticism 
in a community: availability of venues for presenting criticism, community’s responsive-
ness to criticism (uptake), existence of shared norms that allow assessing the relevance of 
criticisms and adequacy of responses, and (tempered) equality of intellectual authority be-
tween participants (Longino 1990, 76-81 and 2002, 129-35). To address the second prob-
lem, Longino discusses availability of different perspectives as another important condi-
tion for objectivity. As Longino stresses, underrepresentation of certain social groups in 
scientific community, like women and members of minority groups in Western countries, 
and underappreciation of non-Western science in the West constitute a problem for ob-
jectivity because they limit the number of perspectives recognised in scientific community 
(Longino 1990, 78-79 and 2002, 132). Openness of community to potentially relevant 
perspectives plays a crucial role for preventing collective blind spots with respect to shared 
assumptions.
To sum up, objectivity is seen in Longino’s account as emerging on the basis of social—
interactive—practices in community that is to follow certain social norms; these social in-
teractions make it possible to block influence of subjective biases in a way that is unachiev-
able for an individual. Objectivity is thus seen as a property of communities rather than of 
individuals. This is the sense in which Longino’s account of objectivity is social.
In his paper, Biddle (2009) challenges this view and argues that the conception of the 
individual that Longino’s account presupposes conflicts with Longino’s characterisation of 
objectivity as necessarily social. Biddle suggests that Longino’s criteria depict objective com-
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munity as realising John Stuart Mill’s ideal of the “free marketplace of ideas” (Biddle 2009, 
613 and 614-15) and that Longino’s account is deeply embedded in Mill’s political liber-
alism (Biddle 2009, 615-16). In turn, this connection is crucial for Biddle’s interpretation 
of Longino’s criterion of uptake (responsiveness to criticism). Biddle (2009, 616) suggests 
that this criterion could be interpreted in two different ways. In what he calls the individu-
alistic interpretation, it is applied on the level of individuals—for community to satisfy the 
requirement of uptake, most of its members must satisfy it. In the social interpretation of 
uptake, it operates on the level of community—for community to satisfy this requirement, 
community as a whole must be responsive to criticism, without each individual member 
necessarily being so responsive.
Biddle argues that while Longino does not specify how uptake should be interpreted, 
there are strong reasons to think that her account requires the individualistic interpreta-
tion. First, Biddle reads Longino’s account as stressing the importance of individuals’ ac-
tions, which supports the interpretation of uptake as demanding responsiveness on the in-
dividual level. As an example, he quotes Longino’s statement that “[w]hat is required is that 
community members pay attention to the critical discussion taking place and that the as-
sumptions that govern their group activities remain logically sensitive to it” (Longino 1990, 
78 quoted in Biddle 2009, 617). Second, Biddle argues that Longino’s account shares the 
conception of the individual with Mill’s. In turn, he reads Mill’s argument for free speech 
as describing as the ideal the individual that is very responsive to criticism—the individ-
ual that “listen[s] to all that could be said against him” and for each of his opinions studies 
“all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind” (Mill 1859/1978, 19, 
quoted with emphasis in Biddle 2009, 617). Biddle concludes that Mill’s ideal presupposes 
individuals that are open to any criticism from any source and are able to question any of 
their beliefs, and this is also what Longino’s criterion of uptake requires—a community 
that satisfies the criterion of uptake must mostly consist of individuals that are open to ev-
erything (Biddle 2009, 617-18).
In the decisive step of his argument, Biddle points out that such radically open individ-
uals are in principle able to criticise their beliefs exhaustively and impartially on their own. 
Social interactions may facilitate this process but are not fundamentally necessary. There is 
nothing in such individuals (whom Biddle likens to “unencumbered selves” (Biddle 2009, 
618) discussed in moral and political philosophy) that could prevent the same effective 
criticism from being fully realised by the isolated individual. As Biddle writes (2009, 619),
But if individuals, in the ideal, are completely open-minded—if they are capable of question-
ing all their beliefs, of examining evenhandedly all potential weaknesses in their views, and of ad-
judicating between opposing beliefs, methodologies, evaluative criteria, and so on, in a fair and 
evenhanded manner—then it is false that a community is necessary for the justification of beliefs. 
For such individuals are perfectly capable, at least in principle, of evaluating lines of argument in 
an objective fashion—and of doing so on their own, qua individuals.
Accordingly, Biddle concludes that Longino’s claim about objectivity being necessarily so-
cial is proven wrong, as the individual her account presupposes can fully achieve objectiv-
ity independently from community. He suggests that developing a truly social account of 
knowledge would require abandoning the conception of the “unencumbered self” and the 
free marketplace of ideas as the ideal for scientific community (Biddle 2009, 620).
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I challenge Biddle’s conclusion by presenting two separate arguments. Developing the 
first of them, I acknowledge that it is possible to interpret Longino’s account so that the 
satisfaction of the criterion of uptake would ideally require each individual respond to crit-
icism with the complete openness of the “unencumbered self”. This possibility is prima 
facie plausible even without assuming that Longino’s conception of the individual is the 
same as Mill’s (and that Biddle interprets the latter correctly). On both interpretations of 
the criterion of uptake, for a community to be responsive to criticism at least some of its 
members must be responsive to it. Presumably, the more there are such individuals and 
the more each of them is open to criticism, the greater community’s responsiveness is. One 
can thus reach the conclusion that the ideal community will entirely consist of individuals 
that are completely open to any criticism. Nevertheless, I intend to argue that even for such 
“unencumbered selves” that can impartially evaluate all of their beliefs, the kind of criti-
cism Longino describes is only possible to the full extent in community. Doing so, I go be-
yond Longino’s text and the authors she draws upon and turn to works on tacit knowledge 
and rule-following. Accordingly, the next section is best seen as a discussion of the general 
question whether the “unencumbered self” on its own is capable of objectivity as Longino 
describes it. Biddle’s argument presupposes the response in the affirmative; I argue against 
this possibility and through that against Biddle’s conclusion. I postpone questioning Bid-
dle’s interpretation of Longino’s conception of the individual until the final part of my pa-
per where I develop the second line of argumentation.
3.  Criticism for maintaining objectivity, collective tacit knowledge and rule-following
The argument I propose in this part of the paper focuses on two aspects of criticism for 
maintaining objectivity that Longino and Biddle discuss. This criticism, as Longino de-
scribes it, involves, first, evaluation of beliefs in light of some norms, so that one is account-
able to something beyond one’s subjective preferences. This is the issue that Longino’s cri-
terion of availability of shared norms addresses.1 Second, it involves evaluation of beliefs 
and points of view in light of alternative beliefs and perspectives, so that one’s problematic 
assumptions may become visible. This is the issue that Longino’s requirement of diversity 
of perspectives in community addresses. Discussing the kind of criticism the “unencum-
bered self” supposedly can develop in isolation, Biddle describes similarly that such criti-
cism would involve evaluating one’s beliefs by taking into account both alternative criteria 
and alternative beliefs (Biddle 2009, 619). The aim of this part is to argue that both varie-
ties of criticism require socialisation in community and further participation in communi-
ty’s life in order to acquire relevant knowledge and to continue to use it correctly. Develop-
1  Longino’s idea of norms is wide—she describes them as “encompass[ing] everything discussed as meth-
odology by philosophers of science and more” (Longino 2002, 145). Following this wide usage, the no-
tion of norms that I use in the paper includes, along with general norms of reasoning, more local norms, 
standards of evidence, argumentation and analysis, use of particular methods and rules of good practice 
that characterise a particular area of inquiry at a particular time. While the general norms are unlikely 
to change in the individual’s lifetime, more local standards evolve faster—for example, individuals who 
entered biomedical community before and after randomised trials became the standard would acquire 
different norms.
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ing this argument, I draw on accounts of tacit knowledge (when discussing learning of rules 
and perspectives) and rule-following (when discussing their application). I conclude that 
the kind of criticism possible in community is not possible for an isolated individual.
There is a long tradition of discussing knowledge of rules as necessarily involving tacit 
knowledge. On the more abstract level there is the idea that “rules of action do not con-
tain the rules for their application”, as Collins (2010, 2) characterises the approach to tacit 
knowledge he connects with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas. Even after the rule has been 
stated in an explicit form, one has to know how to apply it, how to adapt its use to a partic-
ular context, how to judge the application of the rule as acceptable or unacceptable, both in 
known and novel situations, in short, what the rule means in each particular case.2 As an at-
tempt to further explicate the rule would raise the same problems on the next level and lead 
to an endless regress, one has to admit that knowing and applying rules successfully involves 
knowledge that goes beyond their verbal formulation. On a less abstract level, the classical 
discussion of tacit knowledge by Michael Polanyi stresses how learning the language of a 
particular discipline (including, I suggest, its norms and standards of perfor mance), is im-
possible without learning “what is meant” by it, without acquiring relevant tacit knowl-
edge.3
Knowledge of shared norms that forms an important part of Longino’s account of ob-
jectivity can thus be seen—like a case of knowing rules in general— as involving some tacit 
knowledge. In order to make clearer what type of tacit knowledge is involved in learning 
rules and norms, I propose using Collins’s (2010) account. With the help of this account it 
is possible to demonstrate that community is necessary for learning rules without which crit-
icism for sustaining objectivity is impossible. It is important to stress that I do not assume 
full compatibility between Longino’s and Collins’s accounts (particularly their conceptions 
of the individual as an epistemic subject). Instead, the point I want to make is that, insofar as 
the knowledge of shared norms plays a role in Longino’s approach to objectivity, discussion 
of tacit knowledge is relevant and Collins’s account provides some helpful distinctions.
According to Collins, several kinds of tacit knowledge can be distinguished depending 
on different senses of explication and on different kinds of obstacles for explicating such 
knowledge (Collins 2010, 1). An element of tacit knowledge can be explicated by elabo-
ration or transformation, by creating a mechanism that imitates a tacit skill or process, or 
by providing a scientific explanation for it (Collins 2010, 81). In case of weak (relational) 
and medium (somatic) tacit knowledge explication of at least some elements of knowledge 
is possible in one or several senses of “explication”. At least in principle, one can explicate 
elements of relational tacit knowledge (explicable knowledge that remains tacit for contin-
gent reasons) one possesses. For instance, one can explain step by step how one handles a 
piece of laboratory equipment in a particular way (see Collins 2010, 91-98 for the discus-
sion of relational tacit knowledge). At least in principle, one can explicate elements of so-
matic tacit knowledge. For instance, one can provide a scientific explanation of the process 
2  In case of Longino’s account, knowing a rule can be explained as knowing the difference between an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of a rule and an interpretation that can be intersubjectively recognised as 
proper.
3  Polanyi’s famous example (Polanyi 1958/2002, 101) is that of a student, observing chest X-rays and lis-
tening to experts’ discussions, and gradually acquiring the ability to see in X-rays what competent radi-
ologists say they see in them.
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of maintaining one’s balance on a bicycle or create a mechanism that imitates this process 
(see Collins 2010, 99-117 for the discussion of somatic tacit knowledge).
Collins argues that in case of strong (collective) tacit knowledge no explication is possi-
ble (see Collins 2010, 119-38 for the discussion of collective tacit knowledge). This kind of 
tacit knowledge characterises human actions in social context. For instance, riding a bicycle 
in a street, in addition to maintaining balance, requires knowledge of relevant social rules, 
ability to interpret them according to the situation, to interact with others and respond 
adequately to their actions. Acquisition and use of collective tacit knowledge requires the 
ability to develop fluency in the language and culture of community, to understand and ap-
ply rules in a way that is context-sensitive and responsive to changes. According to Collins, 
such fluency can only be developed in the process of socialisation and subsequent participa-
tion in the social life of community. Collective knowledge cannot be acquired once and for 
all—with developments in life of community, it changes constantly and unpredictably and 
accordingly keeping this knowledge up to date requires constant contact with community 
(Collins 2010, 30-31).
Collins’s classification suggests that tacit knowledge involved in learning norms, stand-
ards and rules of practice may contain different elements. Some of its parts may be rela-
tional—they are explicable verbally and only remain tacit because no one has the need, or 
the willingness, to explicate them. Some of its parts may involve skilful bodily action—so-
matic tacit knowledge.4 In addition to those potentially explicable elements, I suggest that 
it is what Collins calls collective tacit knowledge that forms the necessary basis for the abil-
ity to learn norms.
Collins’s account attracts attention to two crucial aspects of this learning. First, rules 
may be interpreted and applied appropriately or inappropriately, and this appropriateness 
depends on the context of application. Rules in abstraction can be interpreted in many pos-
sible ways; in order for them to play their part in critical practices for blocking subjective 
biases, a (somewhat) stable intersubjective understanding of the appropriate interpretation 
is required. Accordingly, in order to be able to use rules one has to acquire with them the 
knowledge what counts as appropriate performance, and this knowledge has to be acquired 
by being immersed in community of those who already posses these norms and can make 
judgements about the appropriateness of their use. Without familiarity with the social con-
text where the norms are applied and the correctness of the application judged, there is no 
possibility to learn what the correct (and intersubjectively recognisable as such) application 
of rules means. Thus, a necessary precondition for one’s learning to apply norms in order to 
evaluate one’s own, and others’, claims is learning them in the context of their application 
by being socialised in the respective community.
One could concede as much and yet defend Biddle’s conclusion by arguing that this 
learning process has an end—the agent who has once learnt community’s norms will have 
no further need in community. One would thus argue that once the “unencumbered self” 
has completed scientific education, the self can be said to know the norms and be able to 
4  Longino discusses tacit knowledge only once, and it seems that she thinks of it as either relational or so-
matic—discussing whether it is possible to criticise tacit knowledge—for example, that one should pour 
liquid in a particular way—she writes that some of this knowledge can be made explicit and the rest can 
be demonstrated (Longino 2002, 104, fn).
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apply them for maintaining one’s objectivity by self-criticism. However, I suggest that by 
taking into account the second aspect of collective tacit knowledge that Collins stresses—
its changeability—one can argue against this possibility. Norms and accepted ways of their 
interpetation—what counts as the appropriate or correct application—may change, as 
community changes. Any attempt to lay down community’s norms permanently for fu-
ture independent use is bound to fail, as these fixed rules will become outdated. As Collins 
(2010, 132-33) writes, “[t]he competence shown by the isolated speaker will not last in-
definitely; the individual is a temporary and leaky repository of collective knowledge. Kept 
apart from society for any length of time and the context sensitivity and currency of the in-
dividual’s abilities will fade”.5
The standards of scientific practice and critical discussion are not different in this re-
spect: in order for the individual’s knowledge to reflect changes in these standards, the in-
dividual requires continuous contact with community. Without such contact, knowledge 
claims that the individual considers objective in light of (once learnt) norms may no longer 
be acceptable as objective for others, if community’s norms or accepted ways of their inter-
pretation have meanwhile changed (recall the example of medical community before and 
after randomised trials became the standard). The relation between objectivity and poten-
tial intersubjective acceptability is crucial here. As noted before, community’s norms at any 
given moment may be effective for blocking individual biases, but if some biases are shared 
by entire community, they may remain hidden—they will not be exposed in critical dialogue 
and may remain embodied in community’s claims, practices and norms. Discovering such 
biases and modifying norms accordingly constitutes an improvement in community’s ob-
jectivity and raises the bar for claims that can be accepted by community as objective. Pro-
posals for such modifications and acceptance of such proposals by community, however, are 
not something that can be predicted in advance. Thus, in order to keep one’s knowledge of 
norms up to community’s standard one has to maintain contact with community.
One may still suggest that an individual could apply once learnt rules in isolation in-
definitely so that the resulting claims would satisfy community’s standards at the moment 
one’s knowledge of rules was up to date. If some of the rules and the ways to interpret them 
have not meanwhile changed, one’s claims can be potentially recognised as up to the cur-
rent standard; even if the norms have changed, one can still be recognised as following ob-
jectively an outdated standard. In order to exclude this possibility, I turn to Kusch’s (2002) 
argument on rule-following.
The starting point for Kusch’s argument is the insight (that Kusch 2002, 97 traces 
back to Wittgenstein) that it is impossible to talk about rightness (e.g., following a rule 
in the right way) unless one can distinguish being right and seeming to be right. Develop-
ing this Wittgensteinian argument, Kusch argues that sociality is the only resource for sus-
taining this distinction. In other words, what Kusch calls “private rule-following” (Kusch 
2002, 176) is not possible. In order to demonstrate that I am right as opposed to the situa-
tion where it seems to me that I am right, I have to appeal to a standard that is independent 
5  In their account of expertise that they approach as resting on the basis of tacit knowledge, Collins and 
Evans (2007, 3, italics mine) make a similar point: “Acquiring expertise is, therefore, a social process—
a matter of socialisation into the practices of an expert group—and expertise can be lost if time is spent 
away from the group.” 
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from me. Kusch suggests that only continuing participation in community provides such a 
standard: if it seems to me that I am right but in I am not, others can correct and criticise 
me; others’ agreement that I am right supports the conclusion that I am indeed right and it 
is not the case that it only seems to me. Self-criticism, for example, relying on the memory 
about one’s past self (or imagining the self as a community of self’s “slices”) cannot provide 
a basis comparable to that provided by criticism from community. As Kusch (2002, 190-
91) points out, in interactions with others one can be surprised by their criticisms and en-
counter resistance in a way that one’s yesterday’s self cannot surprise or resist today’s.
Being able to use even already learnt rules correctly is thus impossible without participat-
ing in community, because community’s reaction to one’s performance is the only basis for 
judging whether rule-following is being done correctly. Without community, it is impossible 
to control whether one’s performance in applying the rule is not slipping. It may seem to the 
individual that one continues to do what one did when following the rule correctly but in iso-
lation there is no way to establish that one is right about it. Accordingly, an individual in iso-
lation would not be able to follow once acquired standards the same way members of commu-
nity can thanks to checks on correctness of performance they receive in community.
A similar argument—the need for continuing participation in community in order 
to learn about various perspectives and to be able to check whether one applies them cor-
rectly—can be made in case of evaluation in light of different perspectives as a precondition 
of objectivity. Longino’s argument for the necessity of social inclusiveness makes it easy to 
see this precondition in terms of tacit knowledge, although she does not use the term her-
self. Discussing the damage to objectivity caused by exclusion of certain social groups from 
scientific community, she focuses on a particular perspective that is based on belonging to a 
particular group rather than on any explicitly formulated and adopted body of knowledge. 
The requirement of inclusiveness means that the kind of knowledge in question cannot be 
separated from its bearer and fully presented in explicated form, or it would not be neces-
sary to demand actual presence of bearers of different perspectives in scientific community. 
Thus, according to my interpretation of this requirement of Longino’s, inclusion of various 
social groups benefits scientific community, as it gives each member the possibility to learn 
about perspectives based (among other factors) on different tacit knowledge.
The knowledge involved may be in turn analysed in Collins’s terms as containing differ-
ent types of tacit knowledge. Bringing a particular perspective into discussion may include 
different elements, including what is, or can be, explicitly stated. However, such a perspec-
tive is ultimately grounded in the social experience its bearer has and thus can only be fully 
acquired by having this kind of social experience, by being socialised in the respective com-
munity. This means that to the degree that a perspective depends on particular social experi-
ence one cannot imitate it if one does not possess this experience. Accordingly, individuals in 
isolation from communal dialogue may not be able to generate some of relevant perspectives 
on their own. One may still be able to think of some alternatives; the point is, their variety 
will be limited compared to that potentially available in an inclusive community. The dif-
ference between the self-generated challenge and the challenge that comes from others that 
Kusch mentions is also relevant here—it seems plausible that one can be genuinely surprised 
by criticism originating from someone else’s perspective in a way one cannot surprise oneself. 
Thus, the only way to benefit fully from a variety of perspectives is to take part in communal 
dialogue where persons with different social experience and collective knowledge participate. 
An attempt to lay down perspectives for future individual reference—for instance, by laying 
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down all points of view that are currently recognised in communal discussion as relevant—
would encounter the already mentioned problem of becoming obsolete. Collective knowl-
edge that members of different social groups possess evolves constantly and the perspectives 
they bring to communal dialogue evolve with it.
Learning about the necessary variety of perspectives thus requires continuing contact 
with community just like in case of norms. Similarly, applying a perspective correctly re-
quires continuing participation in community so that one’s performance can be checked 
and corrected. Without this kind of community’s control the isolated individual runs into 
the familiar impossibility of distinguishing being right (I use this perspective as the basis of 
evaluation and generate criticisms on its basis correctly) and seeming right (it seems to me 
that I use this perspective for criticising my claims correctly). Again, I conclude that the in-
dividual in isolation would not be able to do what an inclusive community can—to evalu-
ate claims in light of as large a variety of alternative perspectives and to have means for dis-
tinguishing correct and seemingly correct use of these perspectives.
To sum up, I have discussed certain preconditions of criticism for maintaining objec-
tivity, using Collins’s and Kusch’s arguments, and concluded that objectivity cannot be 
fully realised by individuals in isolation from community even if they are completely impar-
tial and open-minded. Thus, I reject Biddle’s claim that “unencumbered selves” would not 
need community for achieving objectivity.
It is important to discuss how this conclusion should be understood in the context of 
my response to Biddle. I have argued that the work on tacit knowledge and rule-following 
supports the conclusion that objectivity, to the degree it involves evaluation of one’s posi-
tion in light of some norms and some alternative perspectives, is impossible without com-
munity even for “unencumbered selves”. Accordingly, I reject Biddle’s claim that Longino’s 
account is not necessarily social if it presupposes “unencumbered selves”—according to my 
argument, such an account would still be fundamentally social.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that I argue for the social nature of 
such an account on a basis that Longino might not herself accept and that is not a part of 
her actual argument. The aim of the discussion of the current section is to resist the conclu-
sion of Biddle’s argument: I argue that even if his reading of Longino is correct, there are 
independent grounds to argue that “unencumbered selves” are not able to achieve objec-
tivity, as Longino describes it, in isolation. However, it does not touch Biddle’s claim that 
Longino’s account as it is presupposes the problematic notion of the “unencumbered self”. 
The aim of the second line of my argumentation is to address this issue directly. I attempt 
to show that in Longino’s text there is evidence for a different conception of the knowing 
subject and that the ”unencumbered self” is neither strictly necessary nor desirable for the 
realisation of Longino’s idea of objectivity.6
4. Objectivity for “encumbered selves”
Biddle’s argument about the conception of the individual in Longino’s account is based 
first on the interpretation of Longino’s own text and second on seeing her account as 
6  Previously, I briefly addressed this issue in Eigi 2012, 59-61.
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closely related to Mill’s and sharing Mill’s conception of the individual. My argument is 
similarly based on reading Longino’s text and looking at her account through the lens of 
Mill’s argument.
In order to question Biddle’s interpretation of Longino’s conception of the individual 
in the most straightforward way, I turn to Longino’s own discussion of the conception of 
the individual in her epistemology. Describing her account, Longino (2002, 9) claims that 
her ambition is to develop an epistemology for non-idealised subjects—“epistemology for 
living science, produced by real, empirical subjects”. These empirical subjects, in turn, are 
understood as limited in their ability to be open and impartial—Longino (2002, 107) re-
marks that the important lesson of sociological studies of science is the realisation that epi-
stemic subjects are historically, geographically and socially located, and their locatedness 
matters for knowledge they produce. Thus, the acknowledgement that individuals are in-
fluenced by a particular historical, social and cultural context and their openness is there-
fore inevitably limited is an integral part of her account. Elsewhere, discussing various con-
ceptions of the individual in social epistemology, Longino (2002, 147) mentions Michel 
Foucault’s idea of “the death of the subject”. She interprets it as applicable to the idealised 
subject of the traditional epistemology—the subject that is “capable of the view from no-
where”, the “unconditioned (or universally conditioned) Subject”. Longino does not de-
fend this conception. Instead, she argues that giving it up leaves open the question about 
the non-idealised subject—the “embodied, socially located, and culturally conditioned” 
(Longino 2002, 147) individual. This is the individual that epistemology has to be devel-
oped for. Thus, for Longino the absolutely open self is neither an adequate description of 
real subjects nor the model object for epistemology.
Another confirmation of the limited openness of individuals can be seen in Longino’s 
justification for the need to include various social groups in scientific community. Longino 
stresses that it is not that marginalisation creates an objective perspective; it is representa-
tion of different perspectives that is crucial for objectivity (Longino 1990, 82, fn)—as there 
are no fully impartial knowers, objectivity has to be achieved on the basis of a variety of par-
tialities.
In this idea of “situated” selves there can be seen important similarities with the con-
ception of the individual Biddle himself defends. Biddle contrasts the conception of the 
“unencumbered self” that is open to any criticism and does not have deep connections with 
any communities, ideas or ways of life, with the notion of the “advocate” (Biddle 2009, 
620-22). Due to socialisation in a particular scientific community and deep connections 
with a particular research programme, scientists as advocates have less openness to criticism 
and more persistence in pursuing the line of research they are committed to. Biddle argues 
that this kind of “advocacy” is ultimately beneficial for the advancement of science. I sug-
gest that in discussing the inevitable social and cultural locatedness of the knowing subject 
Longino’s account similarly acknowledges this inescapable “advocacy” aspect of the indi-
vidual.
Thus, in Longino’s text there is evidence that she explicitly rejects the conception of 
the “unencumbered self”, which Longino calls the “unconditioned self”, for a conception of 
the individual whose openness to criticism is inevitably limited. Despite that, one may sug-
gest that this ideal of the individual is implicit in her account because it is what the full re-
alisation of the criterion of uptake presupposes. If Longino’s criterion of uptake is to be un-
derstood individualistically, as Biddle argues, the ideal subject to realise this criterion is the 
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one who is capable to heed to all possible criticism, “unencumbered” by any commitments. 
The following part of my argument aims to challenge this individualistic interpretation of 
uptake drawing on certain statements Longino makes about the functioning of the ideal of 
objectivity.
Crucial for my argument is Longino’s explanation that in her account objectivity does 
not presuppose a particular “objective” attitude on part of each individual but instead re-
lies on the operation of community practices: “The objectivity of individuals in this scheme 
consists in their participation in the collective give-and-take of critical discussion and not 
in some special relation (of detachment, hardheadedness) they may bear to their observa-
tions” (Longino 1990, 79). The ability for full detachment from one’s beliefs that Biddle 
describes as the crucial attribute of the “unencumbered self” thus is not a necessary condi-
tion for taking part in community dialogue and by doing so helping to sustain objectivity 
of community. However, if each individual is not required to be responsive in this way, it is 
the community level where responsiveness should be ensured. Elsewhere Longino confirms 
that her account focuses on the social rather than the individual level: her norms are di-
rected at community structures and processes rather than individuals (Longino 2002, 145). 
This statement similarly supports the social interpretation of uptake, rather than the indi-
vidualistic sense Biddle suggests. In light of Longino’s insistence about the primacy of the 
communal level, Longino’s requirement that “community members pay attention to the 
critical discussion” that Biddle (2009, 617) quotes in support of his interpretation, can also 
be read as requiring responsiveness on the community level while allowing some variation 
in responsiveness on part of each individual.
A community may remain objective, block individuals’ claims that fail to satisfy its 
standards from acquiring the status of public knowledge and be responsive to alternative 
perspectives represented in community, even if the individual behind a particular claim does 
not acknowledge relevant criticism and continues to uphold the claim. Longino describes 
the production of scientific knowledge as the result of collective practices. Modification of 
the initial claim does not have to be made by its author—as Longino writes, “[i]f the original 
proponent does not [modify claims and assumptions in response to criticism], someone else 
may do so as a way of entering into the discourse” (Longino 1990, 73). Whether a particular 
claim becomes a part of accepted public knowledge is not determined solely by its author but 
depends on collective activities in community.
Longino mentions peer-review as an evident example of such critical activity and points 
out that criticism does not end with publication (Longino 1990, 68-69). Extending her ex-
ample, I suggest seeing members of scientific community as continuously taking part in acts 
of criticism and response: by subjecting claims to peer-review and responding to criticism 
received, by providing criticism as peer-reviewers and subsequently judging the adequacy 
of the author’s responses, by choosing to cite or not to cite a particular claim, to use or not 
to use particular data, to attempt to replicate someone’s experiment or to take part in dis-
cussion over a published paper they all contribute to the collective practice as the result of 
which individuals’ claims are integrated into collective knowledge.
Given this ongoing process of criticism, some responsiveness to criticism on part of 
each member is necessary (one cannot be a member of contemporary scientific commu-
nity without being ready to subject one’s work to peer-review). At the same time, each 
particular critical challenge may allow a variety of responses (to retract one’s claim or to 
change it as requested by the reviewer; to provide additional arguments to support the 
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initial claim; to take the paper elsewhere where it would not raise similar criticism; to in-
corporate response to previous criticisms into the next paper etc). In doing so, each indi-
vidual may demonstrate both openness to criticism in some respects and unwillingness 
or inability to change in response to criticism in others. However, as individuals’ claims 
do not become a part of community’s knowledge automatically, this inability needs not 
threaten community’s ability to be objective. The ability of the individual for the detach-
ment and control over one’s subjective biases is less important than the organisation of 
communal practices, and the limitations of this individual ability are not fatal for commu-
nity’s objectivity. Therefore, as complete openness of individuals is not necessary for suc-
cessful critical dialogue in Longino’s account, there is no need to suggest that an “implicit” 
conception of the individual capable of such openness is necessary in order to make her 
account work.
I develop this argument further suggesting that limited openness to criticism is not 
only non-threatening but can also be to some degree desirable for maintaining objectiv-
ity in Longino’s account. In order to do so, I turn to discussing some aspects of Mill’s argu-
ment that Biddle overlooks.
As Biddle justly stresses, Mill’s ideal individual—the “wise man” (1859/1978, 19)—is 
someone capable of listening to all possible objections and potentially ready to change any 
of beliefs in response to them. This, as Biddle argues, presupposes the ability to distance 
oneself from one’s most central beliefs in the way that is associated with “unencumbered 
selves”. Acknowledging that, I nevertheless suggest that there are other strands in Mill’s 
writings. I interpret them as supporting the view that not everyone is required to show this 
degree of detachment and community can live with, and benefit from, having less respon-
sive members. In other words, I argue that some aspects of Mill’s argument can be inter-
preted as supporting the social interpretation of responsiveness.
The aim of Mill’s defence of freedom of discussion is to show that it is community that 
benefits from toleration of dissenting opinions—silencing an opinion is not “simply a pri-
vate injury”, but an act of “robbing the human race” (Mill 1859/1978, 16). It is above all 
the majority, those holding the currently domineering opinions that enjoys the benefits 
that Mill associates with free discussion—the replacement of false opinions with true ones, 
the completion of incomplete true opinions and the better appreciation of the meaning 
and justification of complete truths.
This benefit, in turn, is the greater the stronger are the dissenter’s opinions and the 
more vigorous their defence: “He [the one holding the dominant opinion] must be able to 
hear them, dissenting opinions, from persons who actually believe them, who defend them 
in earnest and do their very utmost for them” (Mill 1859/1978, 35). While Mill welcomes 
the ultimate convergence of opinions on the true one, he also stresses that losing the bene-
fit of having persistent and eager opponents is “no trifling drawback” (Mill 1859/1978, 42) 
of this process. As long as it is not completed, community should welcome those defending 
deeply held alternative views and see them as a fortunate “spontaneous” opportunity to test 
the domineering views against the most serious objections, and “rejoice that there is some-
one to do for us what we otherwise ought … to do with much greater labour for ourselves” 
(Mill 1859/1978, 43). Neither are limitations of openness on part of those defending alter-
native opinions necessarily problematic, particularly given the imperfect state of commu-
nity: “so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpop-
ular truth should have one-sided assertors, too” (Mill 1859/1978, 44).
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Thus, the presence of those unwilling or unable to question certain of their opinions—
“advocates”, “conditioned selves”—does not necessarily threaten community’s pursuit of 
truth. Instead, it benefits community as long as there is enough of those who are capable 
of questioning and improving their opinions in light of opposing views—enough of those 
whom Mill characterises as “the calmer and more disinterested bystander” on whom “this 
collision of opinions works its salutary effect” (Mill 1859/1978, 49). While such disinter-
estedness remains the ideal for the individual, the community as a whole may operate suc-
cessfully as a “free marketplace of ideas” even if not every of its members realises this ideal—
in other words, there are reasons to talk about the collective, rather than the individualistic 
interpretation of the requirements posed by the ideal. Looking at Longino’s account as em-
bedded in Mill’s thus may be compatible with interpreting the criterion of uptake socially.
Again, it is important to pause and discuss the impact of my conclusions on Biddle’s 
argument. Biddle argues that both Longino’s and Mill’s texts point in the direction of the 
individualistic interpretation of uptake. In this section, I attempted to show that this in-
terpretation fails to take into account other important claims made by Longino and Mill. 
Longino’s repeated denial of the possibility of the “unconditioned self” and her insistence 
that the discussion of objectivity is to focus on the community-level processes contradict 
the reading Biddle proposes. Even Mill, who sees openness to criticism as the only possible 
basis for “wisdom”, may be read as supporting the social interpretation of this openness, as 
he describes how community as a whole can benefit from passionate and persistent propo-
nents of alternative views. I conclude that the reading Biddle proposes is ultimately inade-
quate, missing important strands of Mill’s and Longino’s thought.
At the same time, Biddle’s argument attracts attention to an important tension in 
Longino’s account. I suggest that some of this tension may be attributed to the relation be-
tween the individual and the social-level kinds of uptake that I mentioned previously. For 
a community to be responsive, at least some of its members must be; accordingly, even for 
a proponent of the social interpretation of uptake, improvement of the responsiveness will 
require the growth of the number of responsive individuals and the degree of their respon-
siveness—and the openness of the “unencumbered self” may be seen as the ultimate stage 
of this development. I have attempted to show that Longino approaches knowing subjects 
as situated and thus incapable of complete openness as a matter of fact and that Mill de-
scribes the way community could benefit from such an inability, but this tendency remains 
an important source of ambiguity. What I have attempted to show is that this ambiguity 
does not undermine the social character of Longino’s account in the way that Biddle argues 
it does.
5. Conclusion
In the paper, I challenge Biddle’s denial of the social nature of Longino’s account in two 
different ways. First, going beyond Longino’s account, I reject the general idea at the centre 
of Biddle’s argument—the idea that the “unencumbered self” that Biddle sees as the con-
ception of the individual underlying Longino’s account would alone be able to be objec-
tive in the same way as community is. Drawing on Collins’s and Kusch’s ideas I argue that 
a crucial element of objectivity—being able to evaluate one’s and others’ claims in light of 
non-subjective norms and alternative perspectives—can be acquired, kept up to date and 
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applied correctly only through socialisation and continuing participation in community. 
Second, I argue that Biddle’s interpretation of Longino fails to take into account important 
aspects of her position. In her text, Longino explicitly adopts the conception of the located 
and conditioned self and stresses the importance of approaching objectivity on the level 
of community. Moreover, it is possible to make an argument that community as a whole 
can benefit from “encumbered selves” and thus that requiring the fulfilment of the ideal of 
openness from everyone is not strictly necessary. I conclude that contrary to Biddle’s claim, 
there are strong reasons to characterise Longino’s account of objectivity as social, both in 
seeing community as necessary for objectivity and in seeing the knowing subject as socially 
located and conditioned. More generally, the necessity of community for critical evaluation 
of one’s and others’ claims means that any account that focuses on criticism has to be social.
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